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Abst ract - -The  purpose of this paper is to prove new existence theorems of equilibria in generalized 
SSC without assuming the interior condition of the state correspondence nor the strong continuity 
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and also give some corollaries including the Nash equilibrium existence for an abstract economy. Our 
results generalize the corresponding results due to Keiding, Vind and Kim and Yuan in several ways. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In mathematical economics, showing the existence of equilibrium is the main problem of inves- 
tigating various kinds of economic models, and until now, a number of equilibrium existence 
results in general economic models have been investigated by several authors, e.g., Debreu [1], 
Nash [2], Gale and Mas-Colell [3], and others. Recently, social systems with coordination (simply, 
SSC) were introduced by Vind [4] as a general model of economic institutions containing most of 
the known types of institutions (trade market, bilateral exchanges, etc.) as special cases. Vind 
gave a proof of the existence of equilibrium in an SSC; however, the assumptions on agent's 
preferences are rather restrictive. Thus, in one of the prominent applications, the case of usual 
competitive quilibrium, the assumptions will not be fulfilled. Next, Keiding [5] gave a general 
existence theorem of equilibrium in social systems with coordination under weaker assumptions 
on preferences--the same as those which are made to prove existence of competitive equilibrium, 
e.g., Gale and Mas-Colell [3]. Using the Eilenberg-Montgomery fixed-point heorem, he proved 
the existence theorem under the usual assumptions (convexity, open graph) on preferences, but 
the preferences are well behaved on the boundary of the feasible set X. 
In this paper, we shall prove new existence theorems of equilibria in generalized SSC under 
general assumptions on the preferences without assuming the interior condition of the state cor- 
respondence due to Keiding [5], nor the strong continuity assumption on agent's preference due 
to Vind [4] by using the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point heorem, which generalizes the equilibrium 
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existence result in SSC due to Kim and Yuan [6] to generalized SSC. As consequences, we ob- 
tain some equilibrium existence results including the Nash equilibrium existence for an abstract 
economy. Furthermore, we also give some examples in which the previous existence results on 
SSC do not work, but our theorem can be applied. 
2. PREL IMINARIES  
Let A be a subset of a topological space X. We shall denote by 2 A the family of all subsets 
of A, and by int A the interior of A in X, and by cl A the closure of A in X. If A is a subset 
of a vector space, we shall denote by co A the convex hull of A. If  A is a nonempty subset of a 
topological vector space X and T : A --* 2 X is a correspondence, then cl T : A --* 2 X is defined 
by (clT)(x) = clT(x) for each x E A, and coT : A --* 2 x is defined by (coT)(x) --- coT(x)  
for each x E A. Let X, Y be topological spaces and T : X --* 2 y be a correspondence. The 
correspondence T is said to be closed or have closed graph (open or have open graph) if the graph 
of T(Graph (T) = {(x, y) E X × Y : x E X, y E T(x)}) is closed (open) in X × Y. If T has open 
graph, then it is easy to see that T(x) is open for each x E X. A correspondence T : X ~ 2 Y is 
said to be 
(1) upper semicontinuous if for each x E X and each open set V in Y with T(x) c V, there 
exists an open neighborhood U of x in X such that T(y) C V for each y E U, and 
(2) lower semicontinuous if for each x E X and each open set V in Y with T(x) V) V ~ 0, 
there exists an open neighborhood U of x in X such that T(y) n V ~ 0 for each y E U, 
and 
(3) continuous if T is both upper semicontinuous and lower continuous. 
It should be noted that any closed correspondence mapping into a compact space is upper semi- 
continuous, e.g., see Proposition 3 in [7, p. 72]. 
Let (I) denote either the real field or the complex field. Denote O the zero vector, R the set of 
real numbers, and Q the set of rational numbers. Let E and F be vector spaces over (I). Recall 
that g : E --* R is quasi-convex if for each A E R, the set {x E E I g(x) _< A} is convex. Let 
( , )  : E × F -~ (I) be a bilinear functional, and f : F --, F be a given map. We now define some 
quasiconvexity for the map f. The map f is said to be quasi*-convex if for each u E E, the set 
{x E F I Re(u, f(x)) _< A) is convex for every A E R. In fact, the quasi*-convexity of f means 
that the map x ~-* Re(u, f(x)) is quasi-convex in the standard definition for each u E E. If  f is 
an affine map, then f is clearly quasi*-convex. Note also that if f ,  g : F --* F are quasi*-convex, 
then the map f + g is not quasi*-convex in general. In fact, we know that for every A E R, {x E 
F [ Re(u, ( f  +g)(x)) < •} = U,eQ ({x E F I Re(u,f(x))  < #} M {x E F I Re(u,g(x)) <_ A - #}), 
and the union of convex sets is not convex in general. 
Next we introduce the general economic system including an abstract economy. Let I be a (pos- 
sibly uncountable) set of agents. A generalized social system with coordination (simply, generalized 
SSC) F = ( X~, Ai, Bi, Pi, ei )iEI is defined as a family of ordered quintuples ( Xi, Ai, Bi, Pi, e~ ) such 
that for each i E I ,  
(1) Xi is a nonempty set of actions available to the agent i in a topological vector space Ei 
(a choice set), and X = I l jei Xj  is the set of states of the system F, 
(2) Ai, Bi : X --* 2 x' are state correspondences such that Ai(x), Bi(x) are the states 
attainable for the agent i such that Ai(x) C Bi(x), and denote A(x) = YIj~IAj(x), 
B(x) -- I I jEI By(x), for each x = (xi)iel E X,  
(3) Pi : X --* 2 x' is a preference correspondence such that Pi(x) is the state preferred by the 
agent i to x, and denote P(X) = Il jel Pj(x) for each x E X, 
(4) e~ : X × X --* Xi  is an expectation map such that for each (x, y) E X × X,  ei(x, y) can be 
interpreted as the state in X~ by the agent i to obtain when in state x the state y should 
be chosen. 
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An equilibrium for the generalized SSC F is a point ~ E X = Hie /X i  such that for each i E I, 
(i) e 
(ii) there is no state y E X such that the set Io = {i E I I e~(~, y) ¢ ~} is nonempty, and 
ei(~,y) E Pi(x) N Ai(&) for all i E Io. 
Actually, the equilibrium point & for a generalized SSC F means a fixed state of the given 
state correspondence HielBi such that xi is the optimal social state for every agent i. In fact, 
Condition (ii) means there cannot exist a better expected state ei(k, y) different from the state ~?i 
for all i under given constraint Ai(~). 
When I is a finite set and Ai = Bi for each i E I, then our definition of generalized SSC is 
slightly different from those due to Vind [4] or Keiding [5]. However, their economic interpreta- 
tions are very similar to each other, and so we can modify their assumptions to fit in our definition. 
In fact, for a given (generalized) SSC F = (Xi, Ai, Ai, Pi, ei)iei, we define new correspondences 
A~, P[ : X--* 2X and e~ : X x X ~ X by 
A'i(x ) := rljei A t, 
P:(z) := n elP , 
e (x, y) := ei(z, y), 
where ~ Aj =Ai (x) ,  i f j= i ,  
l A t = X j ,  if j ¢ i, 
{ P j=P~(z) ,  i f j= i ,  where P3 = Xj, if j ¢ i, 
for each x, y E X. 
Then it is easy to see that our definition of an SSC coincides with the corresponding definitions 
due to Vind [4] and Keiding [5]. Similarly, we can modify their definitions to fit in our definition 
using'the projection map 7ri : X --* Xi. 
Throughout this paper, we denote x • y the inner product of x and y in R n. 
3. NEW EX ISTENCE OF EQUIL IBRIA FOR GENERAL IZED SSC 
Using the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point heorem, we prove the following new existence theorem 
of equilibrium in a generalized SSC under general assumptions on the preference correspondence 
without assuming the interior condition of the state correspondences. 
THEOREM 1. Let F = (Xi, Ai, B~, Pi, ei)ie~ be a generalized SSC where I is an uncountable set 
of agents such that for each i E I, 
(1) Xi is a nonempty compact convex subset ofR n and denote X := Hie/X i ,  
(2) Ai, Bi : X --* 2 X~ are correspondences such that Ai is continuous, Ai(x) is nonempty, 
Bi(x) is convex, and clAi(x) c Bi(x) for each x = (xi)ieI E X, 
(3) Pi : X --* 2 x '  has open graph in X × Xi such that Pi(x) is (possibly empty) convex and 
xi ~ Pi(x) for each x E X,  
(4) ei : X x X --~ Ei is a continuous expectation map such that ei(x, .) is quasi*-convex and 
ei(x, x) -= xi for each x E X,  
(5) if ei(x,y) E Bi(x), then Yi E clAi(x). 
Then there exists an equilibrium ~ E X for a generalized SCC F, i.e., for each i E I, 
(i) xi E B~(&), 
(ii) there is no state y E X such that the set Io = {i E I I ei(~, y) 7 ~ 3:i} is nonempty, and 
ei(~,y) E Pi(x) n Ai(~) for all i E Io. 
PROOF. For each i E I, first assume that Pi(x) = 0 for all x E X. Since each Ai is up- 
per semicontinuous, by Propositions 7.3.17 in [8], co(clAi) is Mso upper semicontinuous, and 
hence, Hiet co(cl Ai) is upper semicontinuous and has nonempty compact convex value. Then, 
by the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point heorem, there exists a fixed point ~ E X such that ~ E 
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IIie~ co(clAi)(:~), i.e., xi E co(clAi)(~) C Bi(&) for each i E I .  And Conclusion (ii) is automati- 
cally satisfied, so that we have an equilibrium & for F. 
For each i E I ,  we may assume that there exists a point x E X such that P/(x) is nonempty 
open, and so Xi has nonempty interior. For each i E I ,  we first define a map 
fi : X x X x YI~Ez~" ~ 
by 
fi(x, y,p) :-- pi. ei(x, y), for each x -- (xi)~ei, Y = (Yi)ieI E X, P =- (Pi)iel E H ie /R  n. 
Then, by assumption (4), fi is continuous and fi(x, .,p) is quasi-convex. In fact, for each 
i E I, the map y H Pi • ei(x, y) is quasi-convex. Using fi, we now define the correspondence 
¢ i :XxHie l~ n~2 X~ by 
¢~(x,p) :={yi l y=(yj)jeI E Hjelco(clAj)  (x)with f~(x,y,p) <- y'En~e,infco(cl A~)(x) f i (x ,y ' ,p)  } ,  
for each x E X, p E l-liEi]~ n. 
Since each Ai is continuous, by Propositions 7.3.17 in [8], co(clAi) is also continuous, and 
hence, Hiel co(cl Ai) is continuous and has nonempty compact value. By Proposition 2.5.3 in [7] 
and the fact that the projection map ~r : X ~ Xi is continuous, we can obtain that ¢i is upper 
semicontinuous. Also, since f i(x,. ,p) is quasi-convex and each IIielCO(clAi)(x) is nonempty 
closed convex, by assumption (2), each ¢i(x,p) is a nonempty closed convex subset of Bi(x) 
in Xi. 
Furthermore, since Xi is compact convex and has a nonempty interior, we can find a nonempty 
compact convex absorbing neighborhood Y~ of O in ~.  Then, for each i E I ,  we define the 
correspondence ~i : X x HiEIri ~ 2 Yi by 
{p' E Y, ] p' ~ O, p'. x p <_ pP'xi, for all x '  E P~(x)}, if Pi(x) ~ O, 
~bi(x,p) := Y/, if Pi(x) = O. 
Note that each ¢i is independent of the variable p. Since Pi is irreflexive and Pi(x) is open 
convex, if Pi(x) ~ ~, then by the separation theorem for convex sets, there exists a nonzero 
functional in (R~)* = Rn which separates the sets Pi(x) and {xi}. Therefore, we can find p~ E Y~ 
with p' ~ O such that p' .x p < p' "xi for all x' E Pi(x). In fact, by Theorem 8 in [9, p. 417], there 
exists q) ~/3 E ~n such that/3.x ~ </3.xi for all x ~ E Pi(x). Since Y/is an absorbing neighborhood 
of O, there exists k > 0 such that p~ := k-/3 E Y/. Then p~ satisfies p~.x ~ <_ p' .xi for all x ~ E Pi(x). 
Thus, ¢i has nonempty value, and it is easy to show that ~bi has closed convex value. 
Next we shall show that ~bi is upper semicontinuous. If Pi(x) = 0, then ~Pi is trivially upper 
semicontinuous at (x,p). If Pi(x) 7 ~ O, since X × YIiEIY/ and Y/ are compact sets, it suffices 
to show that the graph of ~bi is closed. For the direct set J ,  we choose two nets (x',p~')~.ej 
and (15~)~ej converging to (x,p) and 15, respectively, and 15v E ¢i(x~,p ~') for each ~ E J,  then 
we must show that 15 E ~i(x,p). Suppose the contrary. Then there exists & E Pi(x) such that 
15. ~ > 15. xi. Since Pi has open graph and (x~') converges to xi, there exists ~o E J such that for 
any y > Vo, 15 • & :>/5. x i" and & E Pi(x~'). Since 15~ --* 15, we also have 15" • ~ > 15~ • x i .~ But this 
contradicts the fact that 15~ E ¢i(x~,p'). Therefore, we have 15. x ~ _< 15. xi, for all x ~ E Pi(x), and 
hence, 15 E ¢i(x,p). Therefore, ¢i has closed graph, and hence, ¢i is upper semicontinuous. 
Finally, we define • : X × YIi~ Y~ --* 2 x×n~ v~ by 
• (x,p) := HieI¢i(x,P) x Hi~I¢i(x,p),  for each x = (x i )~  E X, P = (Pi)ieI ~ HielYi. 
Since ¢i and ¢i have nonempty compact convex values, (I) is has nonempty compact convex 
value in a compact convex set X x 1-Ii~Y/. Also, since ¢4 and ¢i are upper semicontinuous for 
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each i • I, by Proposition 3 in [10], the correspondence ~i is upper semicontinuous. Therefore, 
by the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point heorem, there exists a point (x,lo) • X × HieI Y~ such that 
(2,1~) • ~(2,i~). Therefore, for each i 6 I, 2i • Cs(2,p) and/5i • ~bi(~,i~), and hence, for each 
i • I, 2i • co(clAi)(2) C B~(2), and 
fi (x, 2, i0) <_ fi (2, y, i0), for all y • Hs6~ co (cl As) (2). (,) 
We now claim that 2 is the desired equilibrium for F. So it remains to show the equilibrium 
condition (ii) for 2. Suppose the contrary. Then there exist 9 E X and a nonempty subset Io C I 
such that ei(2,9) E Pi(2) n Ai(2) for all i E Io and es(2, y) = 2~ for each i E I \ Io. Then, for 
each i E Io, ei(2,9) E Ai(2) C Bi(2), by assumption (5), Yi E clAi(2) and ei(~,9) E Pi(2). Since 
e~(2,9) -- 2i 6 co(clAi)(~) C Bi(2), for each i 6 I \ Io, by assumption (5) again, Yi E clAi(2), for 
each i 6 I\Io, and hence, 9 E l-lie1 co(clA~)(2). Since Pi(2) ¢ 0 for all i E Io, p~ E ~b~(2,/~) implies 
that 16i • x' _</~i • 2i for all x' E Pi(2). Furthermore, we know that since Pi(Y:) is nonempty open 
convex and xi ~ Pi(2),/3i(¢ O) separates Pi(2) and {2i} strictly in the Euclidean space R n, i.e., 
for each i 6 Io, Pi" x' </3i. 2~ for all x' E P~ (2). Since ei(2, Y) E Pi(2), we have/~, ei (2, Y) < 10i" 2i 
for all i • Io. Therefore, for each i • Io, we have fi(2,9,p) = Ps • es(2,9) < p~ "xi = fi(2,2,iO), 
which contradicts (*). This completes the proof. I 
REMARKS. 
(1) As we mentioned, Keiding [5] uses the interior condition for the state correspondence A, 
i.e., A(x) c int X for each x • X, but this condition is unappealing in some applications. 
Also Vind [4] assumed that the preference correspondence should have some strong conti- 
nuity properties and also should be extendable to some open set containing X. However, 
in our theorem, those restrictions are not needed any more, and hence, as we remarked 
before, by modifying their definitions, Theorem 1 further generalizes Theorem 2 of Keiding 
and Theorem 3 of Vind to generalized SSC in several ways: 
(i) the agent set I may be possibly uncountable, 
(ii) the interior condition on A is not needed, 
(iii) ei(x, .) need not be an affine map, but it may be quasi*-convex in general. 
(2) If Bi(x) = Xi for each x • X, then assumption (5) implies that clA~(x) = Xi for each 
x E X, i.e., Ai(x) is a dense subset of X~, and Conclusion (ii) means that there is no 
ei(~, y) lies in P~(~:) or the nowhere dense subset A~(2). 
(3) We can obtain the similar conclusion to Theorem 1 using the different assumptions on the 
preferences Ai and Pi as follows: 
(2') Ai, Bi are correspondences such that Ai is continuous, Ai(x) is nonempty, Bi(x) is 
convex, and As(x) C Bi(x) for each x = (xi)i61 • X, 
(5') if ei(x, y) • clBi(x), then Yi • co(clAi)(x). 
Then there exists an equilibrium & • X such that for each i • I, 
(i') ~ E clB,(k), 
(ii') there is no state y • X such that the set Io = {i • I I ei(&, y) ~ &s} is nonempty, 
and ei(:~,y) • Ps(~) n As(~), for all i • Io. 
Now we give a simple example in which the previous existence results on SSC do not work, 
but our theorem can be applied even in the Euclidean space R2. 
EXAMPLE 1. Let I ---- (1,2} be the set of two agents, Xi = [0, 1] be the compact convex choice 
set, and X = [0, 1] x [0, 1] be the state set. 
For each i -- 1,2, let the correspondences Ai = Bi, Pi : X --~ 2 x~ be defined as follows: 
Al(Xl,X2) :--[0,Xl], 
A2(zl,x2) := [z2, 1], 
for each x = (xl, x2) 6 X, 
for each x = (Xl,X2) E X, 
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1 
PI(Zl,X2) := 0, Xl = 2' 
(1-z l ,x l ) ,  xx • 
P2(xl,x~) := O, x2 = 2' 
[0,1- z2), x2 • (1,1]. 
And the expectation map ei((Xl,X2), (Yl,Y2)) : X x X -~ R is given by ei((xl,x2), (Yl,y2)) := 
(1 + x~)yi - z 2, for all (Zl, x2), (Yl, y2) E X. 
Then all hypotheses of Theorem 1 are satisfied. In fact, for each i -- 1, 2, we can show that 
(4) el(x, y) is an affine map on the variable y, and hence, is quasi*-convex; and ei(x, x) = xi, 
for all x E X, and 
(5) if e~(x, y) = (1 + xi)y~ -x  2 E Bi(x), then Yi E clA~(z). 
Therefore by Theorem 1, we can obtain an equilibrium point ~ = (1/2, 1/2) E X such that 
1/2 E A~(~) for each i E I, and there is no state y such that the set Io = (i E I I ei(~,y) ~ ~i) 
is nonempty and ei(&, y) e P i (x)N Ai(&), for all i E Io. However, neither the interior condition 
on A~ nor the continuity condition on Pi are not satisfied, so that Theorem 2 of Keiding [5] and 
Theorem 3 of Vind [4] cannot be applied. Also it is noted that the example of Keiding [5] should 
be modified in order to apply Theorem 1. 
For each i E I, when Ai(x) = Bi(x) is closed convex for each x E X, we can obtain the 
following, which is a generalization of the theorem in [6] in uncountable set of agents. 
THEOREM 2. Let F --- (Xs, As, Ps, es)iel be an SSC where I is a (possibly uncountable) set of 
agents such that for each i E I, 
(1) Xi is a compact convex subset o f~ n and denote X := IIiel Xi,  
(2) Ai : X --* 2 x~ is a correspondence such that Ai is continuous and As(x) is nonempty closed 
convex for each x = (xi)iel • X ,  
(3) the correspondence Pi : X --* 2 x~ has open graph such that Pi(x) is (possibly empty) 
convex and xi ~ Pi(x), for each x • X ,  
(4) ei : X x X --* E~ is a continuous expectation map such that ei(x, .) is quasi*-convex and 
ei(x, x) = xs for each x • X ,  
(5) if ei(x,y) • Ai(x), then Yi • Ai(x). 
Then there exists an equilibrium Sc • X for an SCC F, i.e., for each i • I, 
(i) 5ci • Ai(]:), 
(ii) there is no state y • X such that the set Io = {i • I I ei(~, y) ~ &i} is nonempty, and 
ei(3c, y) • Pi(x) N Ai(~), for ali i • Io. 
For each i • I, when Ai(x) = Bi(x) = Xi  and el(x, y) = Yi for each x, y • X in Theorem 1, 
we can obtain the following existence of maximal element. 
COROLLARY 1. Let I be a (possibly uncountable) set. For each i • I, let Xi  be a nonempty 
compact convex subset of R n, and X := HielXi.  I f  each Pi : X --* 2 x~ has open graph such that 
Pi(x) is (possibly empty) convex and xi q~ Pi(x) for each x • X ,  then there exists an ~c E X such 
that Pi(~,) = O, for all i • I. 
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In some real applications, the compactness assumption on the state set Xi may be rather 
restrictive; and so by relaxing the compactness condition on the state set Xi, we can obtain the 
following noncompact generalization of Theorem 1. 
THEOREM 3. Let F = (X~, Ai, Bi, Pi, ei)~cI be a generalized SSC where I is a (possibly uncount- 
able) set of agents uch that for each i E I, 
(1) Xi is a convex subset o fR  n and Di is a nonempty compact subset of Xi, X := IIieI Xi, 
D := Il iei Di, 
(2) Ai, Bi : X -~ 2 D~ are correspondences such that Ai is continuous and Ai(x) is nonempty, 
Bi(x) is convex, and clAi(x) C Bi(x) for each x = (xi)iei E X ,  
(3) the correspondence Pi : X ~ 2 D~ has open graph such that Pi(x) is (possibly empty) 
convex and xi q~ Pi(x) for each x E X,  
(4) ei : X x D --* Ei is a continuous expectation map such that ei(x, .) is quasi*-convex and 
ei(x, x) = xi for each x E D, 
(5) if ei(x,y) E Bi(x), then Yi E clAi(x). 
Then there exists an equilibrium ~ E D for a generalized SCC F, i.e., for each i E I, 
(i) e 
(ii) there is no state y E X such that the set Io = {i E I ] ei(~, y) ¢ ~i} is nonempty, and 
ei( , y) E Pi( ) n eor all i • Io. 
PROOF. We can repeat most of the proof of Theorem 1 except some definitions of correspondences 
as follows. 
For each i • I, define the correspondence ¢i : X x I I ielR n --~ 2 D~ by 
¢i(z,p) := ~y~ • co (c lA i ) ( z ) ly  • n3e~ co(cl&)(x) 
[ 
with f i (x,y,p) <_ inf fi (x, y', p) 7 ,  
y'Eco(cl A~)(x) J 
for each x E X, p E l-liei ~n. 
Then, ¢i is upper semicontinuous such that each ¢i (x, p) is a nonempty closed convex subset of 
a compact set Di. For each i E I, we may assume that there exists a point x E X such that Pi(x) 
is nonempty open, and so Di has nonempty interior. Since Di is a compact subset of Xi, we can 
find a nonempty compact convex absorbing neighborhood Y~ of O in R n. Then we can define the 
correspondence ¢i : X × IIielY~ --~ 2 y~ in the same manner as in the proof of Theorem 1. 
Finally, we define • :X  x HiEI Y/ ---* 2 n'el D~xH~e! Yi by 
• (x,p) := I I iel¢i(x,p) x IIiel~bi(x,p), for each x = (xi)ieI E X,  P = (Pi)iEl E [IiEI Yi. 
Since ¢i and ~Pi are upper semicontinuous and have nonempty compact convex values, ~ is upper 
semicontinuous ona convex set X x HiEI Yi mapping to a nonempty compact set H ie /D i  x Hie/Y~, 
and has nonempty compact convex value. Therefore, by applying the Himmelberg fixed-point 
theorem, there exists a point (~,~3) E X × Hie1Yi such that (2,p) E O(~,p). Then, by following 
the method in the proof of Theorem 1, we can show that 2 E X is the desired equilibrium for a 
generalized SSC F. I 
REMARKS. 
(1) When X~ = Di is compact and convex for each i E I, then Theorem 3 reduces to Theo- 
rem 1. 
(2) It should be noted that in Theorem 3 of [5], the image of the state correspondence A must 
be convex and is contained in the interior of the state set X, and hence, we can simplify 
his proof by using the Fan-Glicksberg fixed-point heorem rather than the Eilenberg- 
Montgomery fixed-point heorem. 
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Next we give another example of noncompact generalized SSC in which the previous existence 
results on SSC do not work but our theorem can be applied. 
EXAMPLE 2. Let I = N be the countable set of agents. For each i • N, let Xi  = [0, oc) be the 
convex choice set, Di = [0, 1] be a compact subset of Xi ,  and X = rl ieNXi, D = IIi~r~Di be the 
state sets. 
Let the correspondences Ai, Bi, Pi : X --+ 2 D~ be defined as follows: 
{i ) 1 Ai(x)  := xi - ~ ,x i  N Di, 
{1}, 
S [O, xi], x~ • [0,1), 
Bi(x)  
{1}, xi • [1, oo), 
(xi ,1),  xi • [0,1), 
Pi(x) := O, xi = 1, 
(1 ,  1) , xi E (1, oo). 
X i = 0, 
xi • (0, 1), 
z~ • [1, oo), 
And the expectation map ei : X x D ---+ ]R is given by 
ei(x,Y)  := (l + xi)Yi  - x~i, fo ra l lxEX,  y E D. 
Then all hypotheses of Theorem 3 are satisfied. In fact, for each i E N, we can show that 
(4) ei(x, y) is an affine map on the variable y, and hence, is quasi*-convex; and ei(x, x) = xi 
for all x E D, and 
2 Bi(x) ,  then E clAi(x). (5) i f e i (x ,y )  = (1 + xi)yi -x i  E Yi 
In fact, i fx i  < 1, then ei(x ,y)  E Ai (x)  implies that yi < xi, and hence, yi E c lA i (x) .  I fx i  > 1, 
then Yi E Ai(x)  implies that yi > 1 and Yi E Di, and so Yi = 1 E clAi(x). 
Therefore by Theorem 3, we can obtain an equilibrium point ~ = (1, . . . ,  1 . . . .  ) E X such that 
1 E Bi(2) for each i E I, and there is no state y such that the set Io = {i E I I ei(fc, y) ~ 1} is 
nonempty and ei(a~, y) E P/(a~) A Ai(~) for all i E Io. 
However, Theorem 2 in [5] or Theorem 3 in [4] cannot be directly applied to this setting since 
the image Ai(x)  is not contained in the interior of Xi for each i E I, and the state set X is not 
compact. 
For each i E I, when Ai(x)  = B i (x)  and el(x, y) = Yi for each x E X, y E D in Theorem 3, 
then we obtain the following existence theorem of Nash equilibrium for a generalized abstract 
economy. 
THEOREM 4. Let F = (X~, Ai, Pi)iEI be an abstract economy where I is an uncountable set of 
agents such that for each i E I, we have the following. 
(1) Xi  is a convex subset of R n, Di is a nonempty  compact subset of X i  and X := IIiEi X~, D := 
Yliei Di. 
(2) A~ : X -* 2 D~ is continuous such that A i (x)  is a nonempty  closed convex for each x = 
(x~)iel E X .  
(3) The correspondence Pi : X --+ 2 D~ has open graph such that Pi(x) is (possibly empty)  
convex and xi • Pi(x) for each x • X .  
Then there exists an equilibrium ~ • D for F, i.e., for each i • I, 
xi E Ai (5) and Pi (fc) A Ai (fc) = ~J. 
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PROOF. For each i E 1, it remains to show Pi(~) n Ai(~)  = 0. For each Yi E X i  with Yi ~t xi, by 
Conclusion (ii) in Theorem 3, we must have ei(~, y) = Yi ~ Pi(.~)MAi(~). Also, by Assumption (3), 
xi ~t P i (x)  M Ai(~), and hence, Pi(x) N Ai(~) = ~. This completes the proof. | 
For each i E I ,  when Pi(x) = 0 for each x E X in Theorem 4, then we obtain the following 
fixed-point heorem as an easy consequence. 
COROLLARY 2. Let I be an uncountable set. For each i E I, let X i  be a nonempty  convex 
subset of  R n, Di be a nonempty  compact subset of  Xi ,  and X := II ieI Xi .  I f  for each i E I ,  
Ai : X ~ 2 D~ is continuous uch that A i (x)  is nonempty  convex for each x E X ,  then there exists 
an & E X such that 3ci E clAi(~) for every i  E I. 
REMARKS. Our definition of a generalized SSC could be applied to general economic models 
containing state correspondences which do not have closed convex values or noncompact strategy 
set. Thus, our existence results can be used to prove the existence of competit ive quilibrium for 
general economic models containing bilateral exchanges, trade in a market without the interior 
condition, the continuity, and some boundedness restriction on the preferences and state sets 
imposed by Vind [4], Keiding [5], and others. 
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